human society . . . ' (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965 . This was a deft piece of intellectual imperialism. Sociology, political science, and economics -as they studied particular types of societies, or different aspects of particular societies, smaller realities in the larger whole -were reduced to sub-disciplines within anthropology, as they well should be. At roughly the same time, largely at Columbia University, Franz Boas and his associates were devising an even vaster anthropology which would be 'the science of man' in all aspects, biological as well as cultural (Kroeber, 1963 (Kroeber, /1923 . Thus, anthropology was the most comprehensive discipline investigating humanity in either its 19th century form or its two variants in the first half of the 20th century. It was a vast project sending 'new Herculeses' everywhere to erect a human science and in science: theory counts! That was then; what can be said of the anthropological present? Sherry Ortner, writing on the subject of anthropological theory since the 1960s, determined that it had become 'a thing of shreds and patches' (Ortner, 1984: 126) . Judgements in the 1990s continued Ortner's concern. Keith Hart, in 1990, castigated anthropology as 'alienated . . . and lacking any vision' (in Firth, 1992: 208) . Joel Kahn (1990: 230) described it in a state of 'methodological and epistemological crisis'. Debate in the US pertains to whether the discipline is 'self destructing' (Knauft, 1996: 1) . Sahlins (1995: 14) believes that ' "Culture" . . . is in the twilight of its career, and anthropology with it'. Geertz agrees, prophesying that the discipline will probably disappear in about 50 years (in Handler, 1991: 612) . Such opinions, according to Knauft (1996: 296) , are 'widely shared'. The point of the preceding is that significant thinkers question the 'vision', to use Hart's term, of anthropology. It is as if the discipline has gone from a confederacy of new Herculeses to one of blind Tiresiases, sightless seers.
Why does anthropology appear to be in such a situation? There are a number of answers to this question. Certainly, the investment preferences of current neo-liberalism hurt anthropology. Such preferences privilege financing of penal institutions at the expense of those in education. Prisons are growing everywhere in the US, while public universities are declining or stagnating. This explains in some measure why perhaps half of those who have received PhDs in anthropology in the US since the early 1970s have not been able to secure permanent positions in colleges or universities (Roseberry, 1996) . So great a loss of intellectual resources over three decades unquestionably clouds anthropology's vision. But there is another problem.
This problem is, that for a number of reasons, a strong anti-science faction has arisen in anthropology. This faction, in the words of Steven Tyler (1987) , finds science 'degraded' and 'archaic'. It insists upon 'thick description', or ethnography (Geertz, 1973) , in place of science. Some in the tradition consider themselves 'experimentalists' who want to 'trade in the scholarly treatise . . . for interviews, conversations, and biographical portraits in a manner more evocative of journalists' (Marcus, 1993: 1) . Let us be crystal clear about what is being proposed here. The blind Tiresiases will 'trade in' scientific scholarship for 'interviews'. Theory no longer counts in such an anthropological discourse. 1 How does one confront such discourse? One strategy is to bracket it in the sense of the Greek sceptics when they put something in epoche. When you place a discourse in epoche, you suspend judgement on it; that is, you bracket it and get on with other business. If I bracket (war) I set speech of war aside, and get on with talking about peace. If the Tiresiases discount theory, we shall discount -without rancor, with dispatch -their (discounting) to confront the chore of helping to make theory count.
How can one do this? Albert Einstein once remarked that a decisive event in science was that of the 'confrontation of theory and facts' (Einstein, 1970: 29) . Further, for a long time 'many scientists' have been 'fully aware' that there are 'difficulties inherent' in grasping the nature of this confrontation (Lakatos, 1970: 113) . This article contends that a way of making theory count can be had if anthropologists examine what is involved in confrontation, and then take a confrontational stance.
Bertrand Russell, writing in Unpopular Essays, pointed a way to understanding confrontation when he said, 'But if philosophy is to serve a positive purpose, it must not teach skepticism, for while the dogmatist is harmful, the skeptic is useless' (Russell, 1951: 27) . Dogmatism was 'harmful', according to Russell, because it was an absolutist posture that insisted there was Absolute Truth, when it was uncertain whether such truths exist. Skepticism was 'useless' because it, too, was an absolutist position, one whose practitioners produced a lack of knowledge, an Absolute Ignorance. The unilinear evolutionists, like Morgan, with his insistence upon the absolute truth of one line of evolution from savagery to civilization, are an example of Russell's dogmatism. Postmodernists, like Lyotard (1984) , with his skepticism towards all metanarratives, exemplifies Russell's skepticism. What Russell was suggesting was that 'philosophy', here understood as an epistemological stance, could have 'a positive purpose' if it steered a course between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of skepticism.
I argue in this article that a confrontational stance is just such a 'philosophy' and will utilize the social anthropologists' encounter with unilinear evolutionary theory to illustrate why. Argument is developed over four sections. The first section introduces certain basics of confrontation. The second section presents the social anthropologists' version of it. The third section documents the social anthropologists' confrontation with unilinear evolutionary theory. The fourth section explains how the formulation of validation histories is vital when taking a confrontational stance, and provides insight as to how to make such histories. Finally, the conclusion, surveying the analysis of the preceding sections, argues that when confrontational stances establish validation histories bearing upon theoretical propositions, they create more rigorous approximate truths of social reality, a rigor necessary for making theory count.
THE CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE
Different forms of scientific practice may tend toward one of two limits where, as one approaches them, they (the practices) become less and less scientific. One limit is that of pure theory. Here, practitioners utterly ignore observation while propounding nonvalidated generalizations. The other limit is that of pure observation. Here, practitioners only perform observation, while formulating no generalizations. The former limit might be called 'Panglossian,' because Dr Pangloss's discourse in Candide was a babble of theoretical absurdities unconstrained by reality. The latter limit might be said to be 'Baconian' because many commentators thought that Sir Francis, like Detective Webb in Dragnet, fancied 'just the facts'. A science away from these extremes operates under the principle that every generalization should have its set of validating observations and every set of observations should have their generalizations. Such a science is 'confrontational', confronting generalization with observation, and observation with generalization.
It is important to recognize what is confronting what. The confrontation in the confrontational stance is not directly between one group of thinkers jawing with another group concerning whose views are truer, although this can occur. It is a 'confrontation' between a particular theoretical proposition, or sets of such propositions, and reality. Theoretical propositions are generalizations in which there are at least two concepts and at least one relationship between these concepts. Such propositions may be one of three types. Empirical generalizations are propositions that are relatively low in generality and abstraction, and are arrived at through observation. Theories are propositions with enormous generality and high abstraction arrived at through a formal or informal logical procedure. Hypotheses are propositions deduced from theories which are lower in generality and abstraction than the theory from which they derive. 3 Scientists formulate 'theory' whenever they construct any of these three types of propositions.
Empirical statements are needed to allow theoretical propositions to confront reality. Theoretical propositions assert uniformities of relationship in reality. Empirical statements describe how to sense the posited reality because they contain information concerning what sensations of reality correspond to which concepts in the theoretical propositions. For example, Emile Durkheim invented in Suicide (1897) the theoretical proposition that 'deviance varied inversely with social integration'. Empirical statements applicable to this theory are: 'Suicide is a form of deviance', 'Catholicism and Protestantism are forms of social integration', and 'inverse relationships are observed when something goes up when something else goes down'.
Confrontation is based upon having showdowns. 4 The image that this word may evoke is of the moment of truth at the end of a cowboy movie when the good guy and the bad guy test each other to discover who shoots best. I use the term in a slightly different sense. A 'showdown' is certainly a moment of truth involving a test; but what is being tested is whether what is observed of reality is what has been imagined of it. Scientists make observations that produce sensory information concerning whether what is asserted in theory to be is sensed in reality to be. Thus, the showdown in the confrontational stance is between imagination and perception of reality, and concerns whether the sensory information of reality, the 'facts', is the sensory information that particular empirical statements of particular theoretical propositions imagined would be the sensory information of that reality.
Persons adopting a confrontational stance will be involved in two related practicesthose of observation and validation. 'Observation' concerns the sensing of being. It is 'focusing' upon a patch of reality with a particular sense, i.e. vision, and taking a 'snapshot' of it, i.e. of allowing that sense to make a neurological record of the reality.The neurological record is the observation. 'Validation' concerns the production of a particular knowledge about observation. Either what theories assert will be observed is observed, in which case the propositions are validated (for those observations); or what they assert will be observed is not observed, in which case they are falsified. Repeated confrontation of contending theories concerning some reality with that reality results in validation histories which contain information concerning how well contending propositions do when confronting reality. Validation histories provide the basis for assertions of 'approximate truth' (Miller, 1987) . This is not The Truth, but truer truth among galaxies of contending truths given a particular validation history. Confrontational showdowns are moments of truth because at the end of them you know who has the truer truth.
The actual techniques that sciences use when they make their confrontations are their observational and validational toolkits. Some might deride the notion of a toolkit as an unimportant concept of interest only to more technical plebs. My judgement is precisely the reverse. More approximately, true knowledge depends upon more complete and accurate observation and validation, which is what toolkits are all about. Let us investigate something of the confrontational toolkits with which the unilinear anthropologists and social anthropologists practiced their anthropologies.
'FULL-FLAVOURED' OBSERVATION
William James tells us that when he asked Sir James Frazer about natives he had known, Frazer exclaimed, 'But heaven forbid!' (in Jarvie, 1969: 2) .
The anthropologist must relinquish his comfortable position in the long chair . . . He must go out into the villages, and see the natives at work in gardens, on the beach, in the jungle, must sail with them . . . and observe them in fishing, trading, and cermonial . . . Information must come to him full flavoured from his own observations of native life . . . (Malinowski, 1954 (Malinowski, /1926 .
The unilinear evolutionists' confrontational toolkit was based on circuitous and indirect observation. 5 Certainly, nobody had the slightest intention of directly observing those being investigated, as the above quotation concerning Frazer makes clear. Rather, they would practise the 'comparative method'. The basic procedures of this were to first read accounts of the 'savages' by missionaries, soldiers, and colonial administrators to discover survivals, elements of low culture that survived in higher culture. Once these had been identified, the information they supposedly bore would be treated as premises in syllogisms from which other aspects of 'primitive' culture would be inferred. Of course, soldiers, and the like, were gullible and biased so that the accuracy of the premises which formed the basis of their deductions was unknown. This being the case, Malinowski (1944: 26) declared that the 'shortcomings' of unilinear evolutionary theory resulted from insufficient 'attention to . . . reality'. All in all, the unilinear evolutionary theorists' comparative method made the observational part of their confrontational toolkit conjectural.
The social anthropologists' antidote for neglecting reality, as the above quotation from Malinowski underscores, was to get out of the 'long chair' to make 'full flavoured' observations. 6 This included a number of observational procedures championed by Malinowski in the first chapter of Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) that became the social anthropologists' standard ethnographic toolkit and was the observational basis of their confrontational stance. 7 A.C. Haddon and W.H.R. Rivers had actually developed the essentials of the social anthropological observational toolkit following the Torres Straits expedition at the turn of the century. Haddon introduced the notion that the preferred type of research should be based upon 'fieldwork' (Young, 1988: 4) . Rivers (1900) developed the 'genealogical method' during the Torres Straits Expedition. The unilinear evolutionists had made it clear that 'savages' and 'barbarians' lived with their relatives. This indicated who needed to be directly observed. But the evolutionists, with their aversion to actually meeting with the object of their study, could only suggest utilization of the comparative method to make these observations.
REYNA Theory counts
The genealogical method was the first technique explicitly developed for directly observing relatives. It was to be utilized in conjunction with census and settlement plans of localities, and required the collection of the vital statistics, kinship ties, and statuses concerning rights and responsibilities, especially as these referred to the inheritance of property and succession to office for individuals in the census of a particular locality. Thus, it forced anthropologists to see and hear actualities of 'primitive' actors, and thereby gave its users an observational advantage over unilinear evolutionists.
Notes and Queries on Anthropology, used since the 1870s as a handbook of anthropological method, was revised in 1912. Rivers contributed an article to the new, fourth edition, 'General Account of Method'. This was, perhaps, the first presentation of participant observation. A guiding principle offered in this article was that, 'the abstract should always be approached through the concrete' (Rivers, 1912: 115) . The 'concrete' was actual observation of discourse and practice. The methodological point argued here is that more abstract generalizations need to be validated by 'concrete' observation. Of course, the term 'concrete' has its ambiguities, so it is appropriate to probe further to explore in greater detail what it meant.
Rivers was interested in problems of the observation of discourse. He was especially concerned not to conflate the cultural categories of native discourse with those of the observer. This meant that, as with practice, discourse was to be actually experienced so that 'native terms must be used' to designate the meaning of this discourse, 'wherever there is the slightest chance of a difference of category.' Furthermore, 'the greatest caution must be used in obtaining information by means of direct questions, since it is probable that such questions will inevitably suggest some civilized category' (Rivers, 1912: 110-111) . If ethnographers were to know what 'native terms' corresponded to what sensed discourse, then they had to move in with the natives to 'acquire as completely as possible' their languages (Rivers, 1912: 109) , and through interaction in their lives, to hear how these categories were actually used in ordinary discourse. This, of course, meant participant observation.
How did Malinowski fit into the current of Rivers's observational innovations? He went with the flow. His brief treatise on fieldwork in the first chapter of Argonauts added additional techniques for directly observing people in communities that complemented Rivers's genealogical method, but these were amplifications of Rivers's intention of having anthropologists experience what those they observed experienced; for, as Malinowski said, the '. . . goal is . . . to grasp the native's point of view, . . . to realize his vision of his world' (Rivers, 1912: 25 , emphasis in the original).
The Rivers/Malinowski approach to observation came to dominate social anthropology after 1922. Consequently, no more comparative method, no relying upon some amateur's observations and fractured logics based upon those observations. As Malinowski declared at the beginning of this section, 'long chairs' were out and tents were in, as everybody rushed to be there with the natives. So, Frazer's refusal to meet the natives was replaced by Malinowski's 'full-flavoured' observation; or as he put it, 'I saw them through their eyes . . .' (Malinowski, 1989: 163) .
'Full-flavoured' observation sharpened the anthropologists' observational toolkit, strengthening their ability to be confrontational. The significance of this needs to be recognized. Microscopes were revolutionary to the biologists' toolkits because they reveal new, microscopic realities. 'Full-flavoured' observation did the same in social and cultural realms. Theory could be confronted with greater and more detailed observation. Greater and more detailed observation could inform theory. Jarvie (1969: 2) has judged that the switch to 'full-flavoured' observation was a 'revolution' that social anthropology introduced to social and cultural thought. I agree. It is time to investigate how this enhanced power of confrontation was used against unilinear evolutionary theory.
CONFRONTING UNILINEAR EVOLUTION
. . . one feels also a moral separation from the anthropologists of last century -or at least I do. Their reconstructions were not only conjectural but evaluatory. . . . they believed above all in progress, the kind of material, political, social, and philosophical changes which were taking place in Victorian England. . . . consequently the explanations of social institutions they put forward amount . . . to little more than hypothetical scales of progress, at one end of which were placed forms of institutions or beliefs as they were in 19th-century Europe and America, while at the other end were placed their antitheses . . . (Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 41) .
The social anthropologists, as the preceding quotation from Evans-Pritchard makes clear, had reservations concerning the unilinear evolutionists' theories, reservations that extended into moral domains. Consequently, they sought to challenge these theories whenever possible. They did not do so by explicitly applying validation procedures, though I hope to show in the next few pages that this is implicitly exactly what they did. The heart of unilinear evolutionary theory, as expressed by Tylor, was the insistence that culture occurred in different 'higher' and 'lower' 'grades' -with it understood that 'primitives' had failed to make the grade (Tylor, 1958 (Tylor, /1871 1: 1). They did not do so because they were devoid of reason, the key determinant of sociocultural evolution. Comte (1896: 667) expressed this view as follows, 'It is only through more and more marked influence of reason over the general conduct of man and of society that the general march of our race has attained . . . regularity . . .'. 'Reason' organized the 'general march' and, as Spencer put it, the 'inferior races' (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 62) missed their marching orders because they were subject to the 'uncontrolled following of immediate desires' (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 71) , as they lacked 'adequate mental powers' (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 119) . Social anthropologists, using their 'full-flavoured' toolkit, confronted the truth of such propositions. Below, different examples of such confrontations are explored. Let us begin with kinship, as this was perhaps where the social anthropologists enjoyed their finest hour.
Kinship
The social anthropologists seemed to devote 'exclusive' attention to 'kinship' and the subjects 'directly related' to it (Murdock, 1951: 466) . There was a rationale guiding this infatuation with kinship. The unilinear evolutionists, most importantly Morgan (1870; 1877) , discovered that 'savages' and 'barbarians' organized themselves for the most part into systems of consanguinity and affinity. He, and other unilineal evolutionary theorists, then, offered theoretical propositions concerning these systems, propositions to which the social anthropologists took exception. Fortes believed that enough evidence had been collected by the 1950s to relegate '. . . to the limbo of historical curiosities' such unilinear evolutionary chestnuts as '. . . the Matriarchal Controversy; the pseudo-historical REYNA Theory counts and pseudo-psychological theories of classificatory kinship, incest, totemic descent and so forth . . .' (Fortes, 1957: 158) .
The thrust of the arguments in these works was that efforts to confront particular unilinear explanations about kinship with evidence led to their falsification. Morgan, for example, posited an evolutionary sequence for the family that started with 'promiscuous intercourse' (Morgan, 1877: 505) . Try as they might, the old social anthropologists never observed a single instance of this. Perhaps the classic confrontation was between Henri Junod and Radcliffe-Brown over how to explain a nephew's relationship to his maternal uncle in certain populations.
Junod, a missionary turned ethnographer of the Thonga in southern Africa, discovered what he believed was a 'most curious' aspect of Thonga society (Junod, 1962 (Junod, /1913 . Generally, throughout Africa, juniors treat their elders with respect. The curiosity was that, among the Thonga, younger sisters' sons treated their elder maternal uncles with a hearty disrespect. For example, a nephew who arrived when food had just been prepared was allowed to gobble it down, leaving nothing for his maternal uncle. Junod explained this in terms of unilinear evolutionary theory, asserting that it was a survival of a matriarchal stage.
Radcliffe-Brown, in 'The Mother's Brother in South Africa' (1924) -as he was about to offer his own solution to this curiosity, and speaking of theory-building in general, said it was 'easy enough to invent hypotheses' but difficult when 'we set out to verify them' (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 21) -was being confrontational and using the term 'verify' as we have been using 'validate'. He was saying that he would confront whether what Junod's theory states will occur with observations to see whether it actually does occur. Radcliffe-Brown then proceeded to show that crucial aspects of the mother's brother's (MB's) behaviour towards the sister's son (ZS) were unaccounted for in the matriarchal survival theory (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 24, 25) . He pointed out that in more 'matriarchal' societies the MB has considerable authority within the lineage organization and is usually accorded respect. This means, if the MB/ZS relationship is a survival of an earlier matriarchal stage, that the ZS should show respect to his MB. But as already observed, he does not. What the theory imagines should occur, respect of ZS for MB, does not occur. So, Junod's theory appears falsified when confronted with this evidence.
Radcliffe-Brown, then, offers an alternative explanation based on a 'principle' of 'the equivalence of brothers' (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 29-30 ). This 'principle' was a generalization about how particular relatives are treated. His explanation can be summarized as follows:
1 People in kin-based societies group their kin into cultural categories towards whom, and from whom, particular types of behaviour are assigned. 2 This categorization is based upon analogies between kin within the nuclear family and more distant relatives.
This leads us to the principle of the equivalence of siblings, which is that:
3 Siblings of parents are placed in the same category as parents. 4 Therefore, a MB is treated like a mother.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1)
5 A mother is treated in a free and easy, indulgent manner. 6 Therefore, a MB should be treated in the same manner. (Morgan, 1851: 139) . Essentially what was being said here was that the 'great reason' savages had pathetic economies, was that they were not racially driven to 'gain'. Spencer tied this lack of 'passion' to their impulsiveness. If the 'inferior races' were 'impulsive', as Spencer insisted they were, then they were lazy, because -as Spencer put it referring to a group in India -they 'will half starve rather than work . . .' (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 66) . The outrage of laziness was reported by colonial bureaucrats concerned to get the colonized to work for their colonizers. For example, the colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia (today Zambia) lamented that the natives were 'incorrigibly lazy . . .' (in Richards, 1939: 398) . Such judgements were premature because, as Malinowski said, concerning economics, 'There is no other aspect of primitive life where our knowledge is more scanty and our understanding more superficial' (Malinowski, 1922: 84) . Social anthropological research rapidly altered this situation. Malinowski's own work on the Trobriand economy in both Argonauts (1922) and Coral Gardens (1935); Firth's on Tikopia in Primitive Polynesian Economy (1939); and Richards on the Bemba, whom the administrators termed lazy, in Land, Labour and Diet (1939) , provided detailed accounts of non-industrial production, distribution and consumption. These accounts provided a first observational base from which to confront unilinear evolutionary claims of laziness.
For example, Malinowski documented in Argonauts that one aspect of Trobriand culture was the belief that certain objects called vaygu'a -principally bracelets (mwali) and necklaces (soulava) -were of immense value and, hence, desirable to possess. He further established that a particular practice called the kula, where Trobrianders made long ocean voyages exchanging these bangles, was the way by which Trobrianders could satisfy their goal of acquiring value. In fact, most of Argonauts' text can be read as a documentation of how hard the natives worked (building canoes, sailing canoes, etc.) to get their vaygu'a. After reading Argonauts, some commentators might impugn Trobrianders for putting their faith in bangles, but they could not fault them on their work ethic to get those bangles. A tacit criticism here was that natives would labour for themselves, not their colonizers. Attention now focuses upon politics.
REYNA Theory counts

Politics
Here we must deal with politics both in societies that lacked government, the 'savages' in unilinear evolutionary schemes, and in those with some form of more centralized government, the 'barbarians'. Bear in mind: political evolutionary theory could legitimate imperialism if it made 'savage' and 'barbarian' governments incompetent, because imperialists were then justified in stepping in and taking over. Herbert Spencer, commenting upon a group of Shoshone, an uncentralized Native American foraging people, revealed something of unilinear evolutionary sentiment towards 'savage' politics when he announced, that the Digger Indians, 'very few degrees removed from the ourang-outang', who scattered among the mountains of the Sierra Nevada, sheltering in holes and living on roots and vermin, 'drag out a miserable existence in a state of nature, amid the most loathsome and disgusting squalor', and differ from the other divisions of the Shoshones by their entire lack of social organization (Spencer, 1883: vol. 2: 248) .
Next contemplate the account by a Danish traveler, J.V. Helms, of a barbarous Indonesian kingdom he happened upon in the 1880s. Helms confided, While I was at Bali one of these shocking sacrifices took place. The Rajah of the neighboring State died . . . his body was burned with great pomp, three of his concubines sacrificing themselves in the flames.
It was a sight never to be forgotten by those who witnessed it, and brought to one's heart a strange feeling of thankfulness that one belonged to a civilization . . . To the British rule it is due that this foul plague of suttee is extirpated in India . . . Works like these are the credentials by which the Western civilization makes good its right to conquer and humanize barbarous races. . . (in Geertz, 1983: 37-39 ).
The foregoing indicates just how disparaging unilinear evolutionary theory was of 'savage' or 'barbarian' politics. Governmentless 'savages' were like apes living in 'disgusting' anarchy. 'Barbarous races', for their part, did 'shocking' things to their women which made 'good' the 'right' of 'Western civilization' to 'conquer' them.
Most social anthropologists studied stateless peoples, and most, to some degree or other, addressed the issue of anarchy. Evans-Pritchard's Nuer studies became the key to discussions of this question. This research was performed at the 'request of ' the colonial government of the Sudan (Evans-Pritchard, 1940: vii) when the Nuer were at war with the authorities requesting Evans-Pritchard's assistance. It has been condemned as an instance of anthropological collaboration with colonial projects (Johnson, 1981) . Certainly, stripped of veiling hypocrisies, the authorities, bent on conquering the southern Sudan, hoped that the anthropologist would give them pointers about how to rule the unruly Nilotics. Evans-Pritchard gave them something else.
He took Durkheim's notion of segmentary organization, elaborated in The Division of Labor (1964 Labor ( /1893 on the basis of few empirical specifics, and developed a series of generalizations derived from his direct observation of how the Nuer controlled their lives. These generalizations, such as that concerning the 'segmentary principle' (EvansPritchard, 1940: 263) , sought to explain how segmentary lineages actually governed various aspects of social life without all the bother and expense of government. When ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1 (1) confronted with evidence, the unilinear evolutionary claim of savage anarchy was unsubstantiated. Thus, in effect, what Evans-Pritchard did in The Nuer was, instead of showing the colonialists how to rule, showed them that those they were killing in order to rule, ruled themselves quite well. Of course, he did not openly criticize the colonialists. He merely pointed a finger and thanked the authorities for their 'hospitality' (Evans-Pritchard, 1940: vii) .
Other social anthropologists replicated Evans-Pritchard's findings by observing other institutions by which 'savages' controlled themselves. There were institutions that did this by organizing people on the basis of age (Wilson, 1951; Gulliver, 1963) . Equally important were studies of the feud (Evans-Pritchard, 1940) , witchcraft (Bohannon, 1958) , and divination and ancestor worship (Middleton, 1960) , which showed how these operated, often together, to motivate people to comply with the values of their society. Such findings, summarized in Gluckman (1963) , Mair (1962) and Schapera (1956) , falsified the unilinear evolutionary assertion that 'savages' lived in anarchy. In fact, they governed themselves so well that a new approximate truth seemed to have emerged. Fortes expressed this when, on the basis of his Tallensi fieldwork, he offered what amounted to an empirical generalization that 'economic life' among the Tallensi 'made possible' a social 'equilibrium' (Fortes, 1945: x) . Out with the old, anarchy; in with the new, equilibrium.
Let us turn to barbarous states. In African Political Systems (Fortes and EvansPritchard, 1940) , these were given the designation 'Type A' societies and their study began later than did that of uncentralized polities. However, by the 1950s, social anthropologists had provided the most extensive analysis of non-Western centralized polities that had been offered up to that time. These included, in southern Africa, Krige's (1936) account of the Zulu and her (1943) description of the Luvedu; H. Kuper's (1947) analysis of the Swazi; and Schapera's (1940) investigations among the Tswana. There were, in eastern Africa, Barnes's (1954) inquiry into the Ngoni; Fallers's (1956) work among the Soga; and Southwald's (1961) study of the Ganda. Finally, in west Africa, S.F. Nadel (1942) wrote on the Nupe; Bradbury (1957) researched Benin; Lloyd (1954) analysed the Yoruba; and M.G. Smith (1960) 
This was a diverse group of studies. However, they generally corroborated the conclusions of the authors who wrote about centralized societies in African Political Systems. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard summarized these findings. If African states were not liberal Western democracies, nevertheless, . . . the government of an African state consists in a balance of power and authority on the one side and obligation and responsibility on the other. Everyone who holds political office has responsibilities for the public weal corresponding to his rights and privileges. The distribution of political authority provides a machinery by which the various agents of government can be held to their responsibilities. A chief or a king has the right to exact tax, tribute, and labour service from his subjects; he has the corresponding obligation to dispense justice to them, to ensure their protection from enemies and to safeguard their general welfare by ritual acts and observances. The structure of an African state implies that kings and chiefs rule by consent. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940: 12) 
REYNA Theory counts
The crucial judgement here is that 'Type A' politics were found to exhibit a 'balance of power' and to have mechanisms that allowed rulers to govern with the 'consent' of the governed.
Again, confrontation suggested a new approximate truth. The states in societies colonized by imperialists did not really do such 'shocking' things. Rather, it appeared to be the case that they managed with at least some of the attributes of soi disant 'civilized' liberal democracies. Implicit in this approximate truth was a criticism of imperialism. Helms had expressed the imperialist position when he said the civilized had a 'right to conquer', because they could 'humanize' the 'barbarous'. However, the social anthropologists reported that it was mistaken to represent non-Western states as 'barbarous', which eliminated any imperialist justification of their 'right to conquer'. It is time to turn to religion.
Religion
The study of religion had been an important feather in the cap of unilinear evolutionary theory. The most celebrated scholar dealing with this topic was E.B. Tylor who, as a result of the application of the comparative method over an enormous range of materials, believed that he had discovered the first form of religion. This was 'animism', '. . . the general belief in spiritual beings' (Tylor, 1871, vol. 2: 10) . Tylor saw animism arising from a 'childlike philosophy' (Tylor, 1871, vol. 2: 100) . Similarly, he commented upon the proliferation of magical beliefs among the natives. These he believed were illusional, and that magic itself was '. . . one of the most pernicious delusions that ever vexed mankind' (Tylor, 1871, vol. 1: 112) . Morgan (1877: 5) caught this spirit when he said, '. . . primitive religions are grotesque'. Religion, then, among the 'lower races' was full of 'magical terrors' that took the form of 'grotesque', 'childlike' 'delusions', and thus appeared to confirm the claim that 'inferior races' could not make the grade because they lacked reason.
There was a considerable old social anthropological research in religion. Perhaps the most influential research was that of Evans-Pritchard among the Azande (1937) and Nuer (1956) . Additionally important, however, were Nadel's (1954), Middleton's (1960) , Leinhardt's (1961) , and Douglas's (1966) contributions. Much is divergent in these studies, but common to all was a reluctance to issue sweeping proclamations, such as Tylor's that he had found the first form of religion. Rather, as Nadel put it, in the spirit of cautious confrontational science, 'Today we have grown more modest, but also more conscious of the need for precision and solid empirical evidence' (Nadel, 1957: 198) . However, all agreed with Evans-Pritchard, speaking of the Nuer, that the evidence pointed to one truth, that the '. . . religious thought' of those they analysed was, 'remarkably sensitive, refined and intelligent. It is also highly complex' (Evans-Pritchard, 1956: 311) .
The essential text reporting evidence in support of this proposition was EvansPritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (1937). Commenting upon it almost two decades after its original publication, Evans-Pritchard said that it was an attempt to take 'what at first glance' seems to be the 'absurd superstition ' (1962: 102) of Azande beliefs and practices involving witches and '. . .to make [these] intelligible, all of which are foreign to the mentality of a modern Englishman, by showing how they form a comprehensible system of thought. . .and how this system of thought is related ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1) to social activities, social structure, and the life of the individual' (Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 98) . Further, he allowed that the complex system of beliefs surrounding Azande witchcraft '. . . make sense only when they are seen as interdependent parts of a whole' which has a 'logical structure' (Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 99) .
The point of the preceding is twofold. The Azande may not have had Cartesian reason that Comte could recognize, but they had a 'logical structure', a reason. So, 'savage' thought was not 'childlike'. Rather, evidence supported a new approximate truth. There were forms of reason that existed of which the 'savages' were informed, and Comte and his colleagues were oblivious. Secondly, implicit in Evans-Pritchard's evidence was an irony. Those who called others 'childlike' turned out to be 'childlike' themselves, because, like impetuous children, they were unable to resist the impulse to make assertions based upon the 'first glance'.
What conclusion might readers draw from the two previous sections? The social anthropologists were not confrontational in the sense of having an explicit research strategy that they consciously applied. Rather, imagining themselves as scientists, they muddled their way to making observational advances, chiefly by replacing the comparative method with 'full-flavoured' observation. Furthermore, if they did not know they were interested in invalidating theory, they did know they intended to confront unilinear theory with the facts; which they did, and in so doing, they literally assumed a confrontational stance. It may be observed that Franz Boas, and his students, were subjecting unilinear theoretical propositions to confrontation at exactly the same time and it became clear: the imagined world of the unilinear evolutionists, so congenial to the Imperial imaginary, was unreal. Confrontation had done the job. Basic theoretical propositions of the unilinear evolutionists were falsified. Now, if informal application of the confrontational stance can have such impressive results, perhaps it is sensible to formally specify some of the practices involved in this stance, especially as they pertain to validation histories, so as to know how to replicate these results.
VALIDATION HISTORIES
A first and fundamental requirement of being confrontational is to recognize that to some degree, all people are blind Tiresiases -rich in imagination, short on vision. The confrontational stance is a way of combining the frailer visions of many individuals to achieve a more exact vision for the social whole. It does this by being a comparative enterprise, but in a way that is unfamiliar to anthropology. Generally, anthropologists understand comparison to be observation of two different societies or cultures -Barma in Chad versus Nuer in the Sudan -in order to discover similarities and differences. This is a comparison of two different realities to understand the degree to which they are a single type of reality. The comparison which underlies the confrontational stance is between two or more theoretical propositions and their associated empirical statements which concern a single type of reality. It is comparison of Comte's empirical statement that primitives lack reason with Evans-Pritchard's assurance that they have it in abundance. If theoretical propositions and empirical statements are imaginations of the real, then the comparison in the confrontational stance is between whose imaginaries are more real; and many visionaries are called upon to make the observations that judge the reality of the imaginary. These visionaries, to avoid being Tiresiases, need to cooperate in constructing validation histories. The formulation of such histories requires concern REYNA Theory counts for confrontational feasibility, validation episodes, validation sets, validation universes, positive and negative confrontation, confrontation records, and rigour, which are discussed here.
A 'validation episode' is a record of a confrontation of a theoretical proposition, or propositions, with the reality to which they pertain. However, before a validation episode can occur, there must be judgements about whether the concepts and the relationships in theoretical propositions are such that a confrontation is feasible. Confrontation, it will be remembered, is observation of whether what somebody imagines to be is sensed to be. Certain concepts, however, defy observation, either because they lack empirical referents or they are simply too ambiguous. Empirical referents are information in a concept concerning what it refers to in reality. Freudian concepts, such as the id, have been criticized as lacking in empirical referents. Ambiguous concepts are those which are so unclear that there is no clarity about what observations could be made that pertain to the concept. Some would admit to there being ambiguities in the concept of equality.
The problem with concepts in theoretical propositions that lack empirical referents and/or are ambiguous is that they do not have the information necessary to instruct an investigator as to how to sense the reality to which they are imagined to pertain. Where, for example, do you look to see the id? This makes it impossible to derive empirical statements from them. 'Confrontational infeasibility' occurs when there is no, or unclear, knowledge of how to sense the reality referred to in a concept. For example, Fortes's empirical generalization that economic conditions caused equilibrium among the Tallensi might be considered confrontationally questionable because it is not clear what sensory information bears upon the concept of equilibrium. Fortes assumed in his text that his readers knew what equilibrium was, so he gave them no instructions as to what they would see or hear that indicated a particular social reality is in equilibrium. If an investigator claims to have made a confrontation, even though it is abundantly clear that a proposition is confrontationally unfeasible, then that validation episode should be said to have been inconclusive.
If theoretical propositions are composed of confrontationally feasible concepts, if empirical statements have been derived from these, then there must be a moment of confrontation when observations are made. This moment is the 'validation episode'. In the confrontation between Junod and Radcliffe-Brown over the MB/ZS relationship, this would be the exact time and place among certain people when Junod made the observations which he believed allowed him to assert that there had been a matriarchal stage among the Thonga. Similarly, it would be the exact time and place among certain people from which Radcliffe-Brown made his observations. In fact, both gentleman were unclear about exactly what observations they were referring to, so that their specification of the validation episodes which form the basis of their judgements is obscure.
The results of a confrontation in a validation episode may be said to be positive or negative. 'Positive confrontation' is validation. Sensation of reality consistent with what an empirical statement says will be sensed. 'Negative confrontation' is falsification. Sensation of reality inconsistent with what an empirical statement says will be sensed. The unilinear evolutionists offered the theoretical proposition that 'the savages were lazy because they lacked reason'. An empirical statement based upon this was that 'particular ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1) examples of "savages" would be found to not work hard'. However, Malinowski sensed that the Trobrianders worked darn hard. Thus, the unilinear evolutionary theoretical proposition received negative confirmation. However, the exact same observations which falsified the unilinear evolutionists' theory provided positive confirmation of the alternative theoretical proposition that 'people labor industriously to acquire culturally defined value'.
A 'validation set' is the set of all validation episodes reporting confrontation between particular theoretical propositions and their realities. Validation sets have their 'confrontation records', which are the number of positive and negative confrontations in the different validation episodes composing the entire set. If the confrontation record in a validation set is entirely positive, then the proposition undergoing validation may be said to be approximately true.
The construction of validation sets is not part of current anthropological practice, so it is not possible to specify with any certainty the confrontation records of particular theoretical propositions. However, it might be said informally that a fair number of anthropologists have examined the question of the 'savages' laziness', and have reported findings similar to those of Malinowski among the Trobrianders. Thus, it seems likely that if one were to formulate a validation set for the theoretical proposition 'people labor to acquire culturally defined value', than it would be judged approximately true on the basis of its confrontation record. However, approximate truths promulgated in the absence of a validation universe should be recognized to be tentative. Less tentative approximate truths are possible when validation histories have been constructed in which there are opposing validation sets. 'Validation universes' are two or more validation sets for two or more theoretical propositions dealing with the same reality. This means that there is a showdown between the confrontation records of competing validation sets in validation universes. Consider, for example, the dueling Comtean and Malinowskian propositions that 'the savages are lazy because they lack reason' versus 'people labor industriously to acquire culturally defined value'. These deal with the same type of reality, that of people working. Anecdotal evidence of different validation episodes pertaining to the two validation sets suggests falsification for the Comtean theoretical proposition and validation for its Malinowskian competitor. If a formal validation universe for these two theoretical prepositions was constructed, and if this universe sustained the previous sentence's judgement, then Malinowski's theoretical proposition would be approximately truer than that of Comte.
Finally, let me introduce the notion of rigour as it pertains to the confrontational stance. Rigour refers to how theory has been produced. The 'rigour' of a theoretical proposition is the number of times and places it has been validated, with it understood that the greater the number of times and places of validation, the greater the rigour. The notion of place in a validation episode needs to be made explicit. 'Places' are regions in reality where validation episodes occur, and the greater the number of places in which a theoretical proposition has been validated, the greater its generality. If a theoretical proposition has received no validation, it lacks rigour. If it has been validated in a number of places in a number of validation episodes in a validation set, then it has still some rigour. However, its rigour is still not sufficient to say that it has some truth.
A theoretical proposition may be known with such rigour that it is said to be true when a showdown has occurred in a validation universe. If the showdown reveals that one theoretical proposition has been validated and another falsified, then the validated proposition may be said to be approximately truer for the validation universe in which the confrontations have occurred. Thus, it is literally appropriate to assert that 'theory counts', because researchers must compute the numbers, places and outcomes of confrontations in order to establish the truth with any rigour.
The case of the social anthropologists reveals the potential of taking a confrontational stance. Malinowski and company disclosed the falsity of unilinear evolutionary theory because of their better observational techniques and their will -however slap-dash -to validate. However, though they took their observation very seriously, they were casual about validation. They were poor at specifying their validation episodes. They did not take different ethnographers' validation episodes bearing upon the same theoretical propositions and explicitly build validation sets. They never formally sought to build validation universes, though on occasion they casually constructed them when Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski confronted Junod and Comte. Thus, the social anthropologists' revelation of the falsity of unilinear evolutionary theory lacked any great rigour.
Further, when the social anthropologists rejected the evolutionists' comparative method, they did something that continues to bedevil the discipline's ability to take a confrontational stance. Rejection of the comparative method marginalized comparative research. Such marginalization still characterizes both social and cultural anthropology. I study my people. You study your people. This means, even though we look at different places, as the term has just been defined, we do not compare them. There is no explicit conducting of validation episodes concerning a particular theoretical proposition among the different places anthropologists study. This, in turn, means that the generality of such propositions is not established, so that they lack rigour. Thus, the absence of comparative research is a fundamental constraint upon the assumption of a confrontational stance in anthropology. Let us draw the argument of this article to a conclusion by returning to the blind Tiresiases and the philosopher.
CONCLUSION
A great deal has been at issue in this essay, for the concern has been to nudge anthropology away from being a confederation of blind Tiresiases, and towards one of new Herculeses', with the ability to make it the central discipline investigating humanity. The blindness of the Tiresiases is not that their visions are always incorrect. Tiresias, in fact, often got it right. Their blindness lies in the fact that they have no idea how they got it right. The confrontational stance is a way of knowing how to get it right.
A discipline that deliberately develops improved observational and validational toolkits is taking a confrontational stance. Such a methodological strategy tells anthropologists when they should be skeptical -when there are frail observational techniques and no validation histories bearing upon theory; and how to avoid dogmatism -by improving observational capacities as well as formulating validation histories. Such histories provide anthropologists with chronicles of confrontation in validation universes indicating that this proposition, on the basis of its confrontation record, is approximately truer than that one. A virtue, then, of the confrontational stance is that, in Bertrand Russell's sense, it serves a 'positive purpose' by telling one with rigour when it is right to be skeptical of a truth, in the absence of validation histories, and how to rightly avoid ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1) 
